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more than mere preservation of public highway safety,
had to be present to allow the police to conduct these
arbitrary spot checks. Privacy must be preserved. Indi-
viduals in a democratic society should not have to live in
constant fear of capricious police searches.
The holding in this case, however, does not preclude
other avenues of police investigation. Checkpoint stops
utilizing roadblocks for the investigation of suspicious
automobiles, roving patrols for policing borders and other
methods of surveillance are now being used to stop the
flow of illegal drugs, cigarettes, liquor, and aliens. Speak-
ing for the dissent, Justice Rehnquist indicated spot
checks are useful tools; productive mechanisms that
promote legitimate state interests, e.g., traffic safety and
public welfare. Rehnquist felt that individual privacy was
counterbalanced by the need to stop the flow of illicit
traffic.
While keeping the requirement of probable cause,
Prouse, supra, has not disallowed all unwarranted vehicle
searches. It has merely addressed one alternative, discre-
tionary spot checks, and left the door open for alterna-
tive, perhaps more insidious methods of surveillance. As
Justice White wrote, "this holding does not preclude the
state of Delaware or other States from developing
methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that
do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion
... we hold only that persons in automobiles on public
roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel
and privacy interfered with at the unbridled discretion of
police officers." Id at 1401. (Emphasis added)
The Equal
Justice Foundation
While the struggle of the 60's focused on ensuring
important substantive rights for the public, the past de-
cade has shown that if the justice system will not open its
doors, a strong position on the merits is not enough.
For information on how you can help work for access
to justice reforms in areas such as liberalizing standing to
sue requirements; easing restrictions on class action suits,
and allowing indirect purchasers to sue for injuries from
manufacturers' antitrust violations, contact Susan Kellock
at (202) 452-1267 or write to EJF, 1333 Connecticut
Ave., N.W. #400, Wash., D.C. 20036.
Pen Register
Not A "Search"
by T. Scott Basik
On June 20, 1979, in Smith v. Maryland, 99 S. Ct.
2577 (1979), the Supreme Court held that the installa-
tion and use of a pen register is not a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. A pen register is a
mechanical device, usually installed at a central tele-
phone facility, that records the numbers dialed on a
telephone-it does not register the content of oral com-
munication or even indicate whether the calls made are
completed. Although the Court has consistently held that
the interception of conversations (via wiretaps, bugs, etc.)
is a "search and seizure," it concluded that Fourth
Amendment protection should not be extended to the
numbers dialed on a telephone. This holding was the
result of the following facts: Particia McDonough was
robbed on March 5, 1976, in Baltimore. She gave the
police a description of the robber and of a Monte Carlo
automobile she had observed near the scene of the
crime. After the robbery, McDonough began receiving
threatening and obscene phone calls from a man identify-
ing himself as the robber. On March 16, police spotted a
man who fit the description of the robber driving a Monte
Carlo in McDonough's neighborhood. By tracing the
license plate number the police were able to determine
that the car was registered in the name of petitioner,
Michael Smith.
The next day, at the request of the police, the tele-
phone company installed a pen register at its central
offices for the purpose of recording the phone numbers
dialed from Smith telephone. The police failed to obtain a
warrant before having the device installed. The pen regis-
ter revealed that a call was placed from petitioner's home
to McDonough's home. The police then obtained a war-
rant to search the home of Smith. The search revealed
that a page in Smith's phone book was turned down to
the name and number of Patricia McDonough. Smith
was arrested and McDonough identified him in a six-man
line-up.
The Criminal Court of Baltimore City refused to sup-
press the evidence obtained as a result of the use of the
pen register. The petitioner was convicted, and sentenced
to six years imprisonment.
After appealing to the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals, a writ of certiorari was issued by the Court of
Appeals of Maryland in advance of the intermediate
court's decision in order to consider whether the pen
register evidence had been properly admitted at petition-
er's trial. Smith v. State 283 Md. 156, 389 A.2d 858
(1978).
FORUM
The Court of Appeals (Murphy, C.J.) affirmed the con-
viction, holding that "there is no constitutionally pro-
tected reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers
dialed into a telephone system and hence no search
within the Fourth Amendment is implicated by the use of
a pen register installed at the central offices of the tele-
phone company." Id. at 173, 389 A.2d. at 867. Because
there was no "search," the Court of Appeals concluded
that no warrant was needed to install the pen register.
Three judges dissented, expressing the view that indi-
viduals do have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
numbers they dial from their home phones; that the use
of a pen register thus constitutes a "search"; and that the
failure of police to secure a warrant mandated that the
evidence obtained as a result of the use of the pen register
be excluded.
The petitioner appealed to'the Supreme Court, which
affirmed the conviction in an opinion written by Justice
Blackmun. The Supreme Court noted at the outset that
the controlling case in determining whether a particular
form of government initiated electronic survillance is a
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment is
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, FBI
agents intercepted telephone conversations by attaching
an electronic listening device to the outside of a public
phone booth. The Court found that a physical intrusion
was not a prerequisite to a "search," noting that the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. It held
that the interception of Katz's conversations violated the
privacy on which he justifiably relied while using the
phone booth, and thus constituted a "search and sei-
zure." The standard that has developed since Katz is
whether the person invoking protection can claim a justifi-
able, reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy that
has been invaded by governmental action. Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
The Court in Smith held that individuals have no legiti-
mate or reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the
phone numbers they dial. Justice Blackmun reasoned
that all telephone users have both active and constructive
notice that the numbers they dial will not necessarily
remain private. This is evidenced through the telephone
company's use of switching equipment to complete calls
and by the permanent records kept by the phone com-
pany of long-distance (toll) calls dialed. Further, pen reg-
isters are routinely used by the phone company for
checking billing operations, detecting fraud, and to aid in
the identification of persons making annoying or obscene
calls. "It is too much to believe that telephone subscrib-
ers, under these circumstances, harbor any general ex-
pectation of privacy that numbers they dial will remain
secret." Smith, supra, at 2581.
Smith contended that, notwithstanding any general
expectations of telephone users, he demonstrated an ex-
pectation of privacy in using his home phone. The Court
rejected that argument by stating that the site of the call is
immaterial. It reasoned that petitioner's conduct may
have been calculated to keep his conversation private,
but could not have been calculated to maintain privacy as
to the numbers dialed. The Court found further that even
if petitioner did expect that the numbers he dialed would
remain private, that expectation would not be "reason-
able." Citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
(1976), Justice Blackmun noted that a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he volun-
tarily relinquishes to a third party. In Miller the Court held
that a bank customer had no legitimate expectation of
privacy in financial information he voluntarily conveyed
to his bank. The Court explained further that a bank
depositor assumes the risk, by being a patron of the bank,
that his financial information could be given to the gov-
ernment by the bank.
Applying the Miller analysis to Smith, Justice Blackmun
analogized that when Smith voluntarily conveyed the
numbers he dialed to the phone company he "assumed
the risk" that the company would reveal that information
to the police.
In a further attempt to convince the Court that he
maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy, Smith
argued that the phone company ordinarily does not re-
cord local calls. He contended that since he was making a
local call to McDonough, his expectation of privacy, as to
her number, was "legitimate." The majority discarded
that contention, noting that whether a call is local or long
distance is not the basis for a constitutional distinction.
Regardless of what numbers the phone company ordi-
narily records, the risk was assumed that numerical infor-
mation would be divulged to the police.
The Court concluded that Smith had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed, and that,
even if he did, his expectation was not "legitimate."
Because the petitioner failed to meet the test mandated
by Katz, the Court held that the use of a pen register was
not a "search." It further held that since there was no
"search" the failure of the police to obtain a warrant did
not constitute reversible error and that the Court of
Appeals of Maryland had properly affirmed the ruling of
the Criminal Court of Baltimore City in its holding that
pen register evidence should not be suppressed.
Justice Stewart, with whom Justice Brennan joined,
filed a dissenting opinion. Although he also found Katz to
be controlling, Justice Stewart was of the opinion that a
telephone subscriber has a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy in the numbers he dials. He reasoned that the
information obtained by a pen register emanates from
private conduct within a person's home or office-places
that are entitled to Fourth Amendment protection-and
that the numbers dialed are not without "content."
Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan joined,
also filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Marshall noted that
telephone users may not know that the phone company
records calls for internal reasons, and therefore users do
not expect that the numbers they dial will be made avail-
able to the government.
Individuals may reveal certain information to third par-
ties for a limited business purpose without expecting that
the information will be released to others for other pur-
poses. Justice Marshall also rejected the majority's
rationale that petitioner "assumed the risk" that the num-
bers he dialed would be revealed to the police. He felt
that this argument was misplaced because implicit in the
concept of assumption of risk is the notion of free choice.
Since the telephone has become a personal and business
necessity, individuals have no realistic alternative.
Agreeing with the dissenting opinions filed in the Court of
Appeals of Maryland, Justice Marshall concluded that the
use of pen registers is an extensive intrusion, and that
evidence obtained as a result of their use should be
suppressed unless the police secure a prior warrant.
* * * * * * * * *
Right To Counsel May Be
Implicitly Waived
by Mark D. Woodard
In North Carolina v. Butler, - U.S. __, 99 S. Ct.
1755 (1979), the Supreme Court ruled that a criminal
defendant under custodial interrogation need not waive
his right to a lawyer orally or in writing: a waiver can be
inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case.
By so holding, the Supreme Court continues to narrow
the scope of the so-called "Warren" court's emphasis on
the rights of the accused.
Shortly after Butler's arrest, FBI agents took him to
their office for questioning. Martinez testified to the fol-
lowing: after determining (method not stated) that Butler
had an 11th grade education and was literate, he was
given the Bureau's "Advice of Rights" form which he
read and stated he understood. However, he refused to
sign the form. At trial, Butler stated he was told that
although he was not required to speak or sign the form,
he was "requested" to answer questions. The defendant
replied, "I will talk to you but I am not signing any
form." Id. at 1756. He then proceeded to make inculpa-
tory statements. FBI agent Martinez stated that Butler said
nothing when advised of his right to a lawyer and at no
time asked for one.
At the conclusion of the agent's testimony, the defense
moved to suppress the evidence of Butler's incriminating
statements on the ground that he had not waived his right
to the assistance of counsel at the time the statements
were made.
The trial court denied the motion reasoning that Butler
effectively waived his rights, including the right to have an
attorney present, by his willingness to answer questions
after reading the "Advice of Rights" form. The defen-
dant's incriminating statements were admitted into evi-
dence and the jury convicted him of all charges (kidnap-
ping, armed robbery and felonious assault).
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the con-
viction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial
court erred in admitting the defendant's inculpatory state-
ments. North Carolina v. Butler, 295 N.C. 250, 244
S.E.2d 410 (1978). In its view, the defendant never
waived (in writing or orally) his right to an attorney during
custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). The court interpreted Miranda as "providing in
plain language that waiver of the right to counsel during
interrogation will not be recognized unless such waiver is
,specifically made' after the Miranda warnings have been
given." 244 S.E.2d at 413. See also, State v. Blackman,
280 N.C. 42, 49-50, 185 S.E.2d 123, 127-128; State v.
Thackes, 251 N.C. 447, 453-454, 189 S.E.2d 145, 149-
150 (1972). The defendant must expressly waive his
